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Probability matching is the tendency to predict outcomes in accordance with their actual 
contingencies in a binary choice task.  It is,however, a suboptimal response if the aim is to 
maximize correct predictions.  I review two theories that attempt to explain why probability 
matching occurs: the pattern-search hypothesis and dual-systems theory.  These theories are 
tested in two studies which suggest that dual-systems theory provides a better account of 
probability matching behavior.  Studies 3, 4, and 5 then provide evidence for an extension of the 
dual-systems theory, called expectation matching, which is intended to explain why probability 
matching is the intuitive response to a binary choice problem.
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Introduction
Most prominent models of decision making share the assumption that people will choose a 
gamble offering a higher probability of winning over and otherwise equivalent (and equivalently 
framed) gamble that offers a lower probability of winning. Indeed, this assumption underlies the 
very notion that people are rational decision makers.  However, since the 1950s researchers have 
been investigating a the tendency of some decision makers to choose a lower probability gamble 
over a higher probability gamble when engaged in a phenomenon known as probability 
matching.  Probability matching cannot readily be accommodated by even the most influential
models of decision making, such as prospect theory (Kahneman&Tversky, 1979).  Furthermore, 
probability matching is tends not to occur in other, presumably less rational, mammals (Bullock 
&Bitterman, 1962; Lee et al.,2004; Wilson, 1960).  Even young children under the age of 5
(Derks&Paclisanu, 1967)tend to behave more rationally when engaged in tasks which elicit 
probability matching in older children and adults.   As such, why adult humans engage in the 
puzzle of probability matching has been an intriguing puzzle for researchers for the last 60 years
because it presents such a fundamental challenge to most decision-making theories.
But what is probability matching?  Probability matching occurs when participants are given a 
simple choice between two gambles, one with a greater than 50% chance of winning a reward 
(usually money) and the other with a less than 50% chance of winning a reward.  It is hard to 
imagine that anyone would have trouble selecting the optimal option when presented with such a 
choice.  However, if you present this choice as a series of gambles, many adult humans will 
indeed choose the less than 50% odds some of the time.  
To illustrate, imagine a 10-sided die on which 7 sides are painted green and 3 sides are 
painted red.  Suppose I tell you that I am going to roll this die 10 times in a row and before each 
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roll I will ask you to predict the outcome.  For every roll that you predict correctly, you will win 
$1.  When playing such a game, people tend to choose one of two strategies.  The rational 
strategy, called maximizing, is to choose the more probably option on every trial (i.e.: guessing 
all green).  This is the strategy predicted by most theories of decision making.  Unfortunately, a 
second strategy is also popular.  This strategy, known as probability matching, is to choose each 
color in accordance with its probability; in other words, choose 7 greens and 3 reds.  Of course, 
this strategy is sub-optimal, because choosing any reds at all is equivalent to choosing the 30% 
odds of winning a dollar over the 70% odds of winning a dollar.  Despite the obvious benefits of 
maximizing, over the years many studies have demonstrated probability matching(seeGrant, 
Hake,&Hornseth, 1951, for seminal work on probability matching and Vulkan, 2000, for a 
review).  
Probability matching is not only common, it is also quite resistant to changes in experimental 
design.   Participants will probability match in any situation involving two choices in which the 
outcomes are randomly determined, but one choice happens with greater frequency than the 
other.  For example, binary choice tasks can take a variety of forms, including word 
problems(West &Stanovich, 2003), die outcomes(Gal & Barron, 1996; West &Stanovich, 2003), 
marbles drawn from a bag (Gal & Barron, 1996), stimuli such as lights presented on a computer 
screen (Yellott, 1969), and decks of cards (Brackbillet al., 1962).  Participants may learn the 
outcome probabilities through description (as described in the die problem above) (West 
&Stanovich, 2003), or they may learn them through experiencing a number of outcomes 
(Tversky& Edwards, 1966).  Participants may receive feedback as to the accuracy of their 
guesses (Newell &Rakow, 2007), or they may make all guesses without any feedback (West 
&Stanovich, 2003).  Participants may be paid for correct guesses (Shanks et al., 2002), or only 
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imagine they are being paid for correct guesses (Gal & Barron, 1996). In all of these cases, 
probability matching behavior persists to varying degrees.  
Given the prevalence, resilience, and importance of probability matching behavior, it is 
remarkable that after more than 50 years of research we still are not able to explain why it 
occurs.   Current theories fail to accommodate all of the available evidence on the phenomenon.  
In particular, I will compare and contrast two alternative accounts of probability matching 
behavior: the pattern-search hypothesis and the dual-systems hypothesis.  I will begin by 
reviewing current research in support of these theories and then present two experiments 
designed to compare and contrast them.  Finally, I will present an addition to the dual-systems 
account of probability matching which improves its explanatory power.  The final experiments 
presented in this thesis are designed to test this addition.  
PatternSearch or DualSystems?
The patternsearch and dualsystems hypotheses provide two competing explanations of 
probability matching behavior.  The literature provides evidence congruent with one theory or 
the other but neither theory has been tested conclusively.  
The patternsearch hypothesis, argues that probability matching behavior is an adaptive 
response to environments in which outcomes potentially follow predictable patterns.  Such an 
environment “primes” us to look for patterns in sequences that appear non-random in order to 
eventually achieve perfect predictive accuracy.  Of course, this strategy only makes sense if 
participants believe that a sequence actually contains a pattern, in spite of being told that the 
sequence is random.  There is a convincing collection of research (see Falk &Konold, 1997, for 
4
review) demonstrating that people are poor at recognizing and generating random sequences.   In 
fact, one must create a decidedly non-random sequence involving large amounts of alternation 
for the sequence to appear random to the typical human observer (Lopes & Oden, 1987).  The 
patternsearch hypothesis argues that, because sequences appear non-random to participants, they 
engage in a pattern match activity which involves generating potential pattern sequences that 
share the outcome probabilities of the chance mechanism.  The result is what appears to be 
probability matching.
One problem with the patternsearch hypothesis to date is that very few studies have 
actually tested it.  Most studies offer evidence that is congruent with the patternsearch
hypothesis, but could also easily accommodate many other accounts.  For example, Wolford et 
al. (2004) found that taxing working memory led to more maximizing behavior.   They argued 
that this resulted from an inability to search for patterns under working memory load.  In reality, 
however, all this finding really demonstrates is that probability matching requires more working 
memory than does maximizing.  This can easily be accommodated by a need to monitor past 
responses in order to produce a sequence with the required contingencies: It does not necessitate 
a search for patterns.  
In another example of congruent evidence, researchers demonstrated that if a sequence 
was rigged such that participants perfectly predicted the “random” sequence (i.e.the sequence 
was perfectly response dependent), they would later report using elaborate patterns to achieve 
perfect predictive accuracy (Unturbe&Corominas, 2007;Yellott, 1969). This was taken as 
evidence that participants are searching for patterns in all binary choice tasks. At face value, this 
provides compelling evidence, but on reflection it is hard to imagine participants reporting 
anything else.  If one finds that they are demonstrating nearly impossible accuracy at predicting a 
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random event, they are really only left with two conclusions:  Either the event is not actually 
random (at which point it is logical to begin searching for patterns) or the participant is 
experiencing ESP.  Given these alternatives, it is not surprising that the majority of subjects opt 
for the patterns.  This does not suggest,however, that they were initially searching for patterns.
Neurological evidence has also been used to support the pattern matching hypothesis.  
Research has demonstrated that the left side of the brain tends to favor a matching strategy while 
the right side of the brain prefers to maximize (Miller et al., 2005; Wolford et al., 2000).  
Wolford et al.(2000)demonstrated that in patients with a left hemisphere lesion, maximizing 
prevails.  They argued that the left hemisphere is important for searching for patterns and without 
a properly functioning left hemisphere participants revert to a maximizing strategy.  However, 
they failed to demonstrate directly that the left hemisphere’s function in probability matching is 
related to a search for patterns.  The left hemisphere’s role could encompassany number of 
functionsincluding, for example, the ability to sequence two alternative responses.  
Finally, Gaissmaier and Schooler (2008)reported that those participants who used a 
matching strategy in a standard probability learning task (with serially independent outcomes) 
were more likely to identify and exploit a pattern when they encountered a sequence that was 
non-random. This directly links probability matching with improved pattern recognition, but still 
allows for alternative explanations.  For example, carrying out a probability matching strategy 
may require that more attention be allocated to the task and may, therefore, make these 
participants more likely to notice patterns by virtue of increased attention.  
The above studies are typical of the support provided for the pattern matching hypothesis 
in that they fail to directly test the patternsearch hypothesis and instead provide evidence that is 
congruent with the hypothesis, but may also be congruent with many other explanations of 
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probability matching behavior.  In general, very few studies have actually systematically varied 
pattern information to determine what effect this might have on probability matching behavior.  
One exception is a study by Wolford et al.2004in which pattern information in sequences was 
increased by including more alternationof the two possible outcomes. In the die problem 
presented earlier, this would mean participants still saw 70% green outcomes and 30% red 
outcomes, but the number of times a green outcome was followed by a red outcome and vice 
versa was increased. Ironically, such a sequence tends to appear more random to participants
(Lopes & Oden, 1987) and Wolford et al. found that it led to increased maximizing. In the case 
of increased alternation, we can conclude that if you make a sequence more patterned, 
participants will cease looking for patterns and start maximizing!  Nevertheless, this study 
provides strong support for the notion that random sequences appear non-random and this is in 
some way related to a probability matching strategy.  
An alternative explanation of probability matching behavior comes from dualsystems
theory (Kahneman& Frederick, 2005).  This theory suggests that to correctly solve a problem 
one must be able to access all available solutions and then choose the best solution among them.  
In general, many problems tend to lend themselves to the generation of some solutions and not 
others.  These easily generated solutions are referred to as intuitive solutions (system 1), while 
more difficult to generate solutions are labeled deliberative solutions (system 2).  The latter can 
only be arrived at if participants are able to override the more intuitive solution and both generate 
and realize the superiority of the more deliberative solution.  In the case of binary choice tasks, 
dualsystems theory would argue that probability matching is the intuitive strategyand 
maximizing is the deliberative strategy.  Probability matching is selected as the intuitive strategy 
because it is (a) erroneous and (b) highly available.  Maximizing could require deliberation 
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because it is not easily generated as a strategy or because it is not often recognized as superior to 
probability matching, or both.  
To date, there is only a small amount of research which may provide support for a 
dualsystems account of probability matching.  Like the research examining the patternsearch
hypothesis, much of this research does not provide direct support for the dualsystems account, 
but rather provides evidence that is congruent with the theory.  For example, manipulations that 
can be interpreted as encouraging deliberation, such as instructing participants to recommend a 
strategy to another person (Fatino&Esfandiari, 2002) or to think like a statistician 
(Kogler&Kuhberger, 2007), have been found to increase maximizing behavior.  Furthermore, 
maximizing is also more common in situations that encourage consideration of alternative 
strategies, such as comparing participants’ performance to that which could have been achieved 
using an optimal strategy (Shanks, Tunnery,& McCarthy, 2002).  Stanovichand West (2008) 
found that those higher in cognitive ability, and thereby presumably more efficient in 
deliberative reasoning, are also more likely to maximize.  Finally, the notion that probability 
matching is an intuitive mistake also accommodates findings such as increased payoff leading to 
greater maximization (Brackbillet al., 1962; Shanks et al.,2002).  Under increased stakes, people 
may be more likely to deliberate and therefore also more likely to maximize.  Such a finding is 
more difficult to accommodate under thepatternsearch hypothesis as increased incentive would 
presumably lead to a more determined patternsearch and more probability matching.  
Although Dual systems theory may provide a convincing account of this collection of 
evidence, these findings are really only loosely linked to deliberative reasoning.  Concrete tests 
of dual systems theory’s application to probability matching are even fewer than those reported 
for the pattern search hypothesis.  
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To this point, then, adjudicating between the patternsearch hypothesis and the 
dualsystems account of probability matching awaits further research.  Neither account is 
conclusively supported by what research has already been done.  Fortunately, both accounts 
make considerably different and easily testable predictions about a common difference in the 
existing probability matching literature.  This difference, which I will refer to as the method 
discrepancy refers two different ways presenting the dual task used to test for probability 
matching.  In choice-based studies, participants are classified as maximizers or probability 
matchers based on a summary of the individual choices that they made on a binary choice task.  
By contrast, strategy-based studies explicitly provide participants with the maximizing and 
probability matching strategies and the participant simply indicates which strategy he or she
thinks is optimal.
To illustrate each method more clearly, consider the die problem mentioned above.  In a 
choice-based study, participants would be shown the die and asked to make 10 different 
predictions in which they guessed either red or green. These predictions would later be added up 
by the researcher and those participants that guessed roughly 7 green and 3 reds would be 
classified as probability matchers whereas those who guessed all green would be classified as 
maximizers.  In a strategy-based study, the die problem would be described to participants as 
well as both strategies and they would be asked to indicate which strategy they thought was 
superior.  Choice-based studies (e.g., Edwards, 1961; Tversky& Edwards, 1966; West 
&Stanovich, 2003, Exp. 3) tend to report lower levels of maximizing than do strategy-based 
studies (e.g., Gal & Baron, 1996; Stanovich& West, 2008; West &Stanovich, 2003, Exp. 1–2).   
This method discrepancy is of particular interest because it lends itself to two 
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distinctexplanations, one provided by the patternsearch hypothesis and the other by a 
dualsystems account of probability matching.
The patternsearch hypothesis would suggest that one reason that probability matching 
might be more common in choice-based problems is because there is pattern information in such 
problems, but not in the strategy-based problems.  If participants probability match because they 
are searching for or testing a pattern, they must see independent outcomes of the event and be 
given the opportunity to produce independent predictions.  Without such experience, there is no 
opportunity to search for patterns or achieve perfect predictive accuracy by employing a pattern.  
Dualsystems theory provides a different prediction with respect to the method 
discrepancy.  According to this account, the availability of pattern information should make no 
difference to rates of probability matching because it does not provide information about 
competing strategies or make competing strategies easier to evaluate. Strategy-based studies 
lead to more maximizing because they make all strategies equally available, thus removing one 
obstacle to overcoming the intuitive probability matching response.   In other words, in strategy-
based studies, participants do not need to generate all possible strategies; they only need to be 
able to evaluate which one is better. By contrast, choice-based strategies provide no such 
advantage.
Thus, the patternsearch hypothesis holds that strategy-based studies lead to more 
maximizing because participants do not observe a sequence of outcomes and, thus, no pattern 
information is available.  If the dualsystems hypothesis is correct, varying the accessibility of 
pattern information should make no difference to the degree of probability matching behavior
observed. Directly comparing situations in which participants have the opportunity to observe 
and respond using pattern information with situations where this is not an option should provide 
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an excellent test of these two hypotheses.  Study 1 examines the effect of pattern information on 
probability matching behavior.  If participants are indeed searching for patterns, then removing 
all pattern information from the problem should make participants more likely to maximize.   
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Study 1
Study 1 investigates the role that access to pattern information plays in participants’ strategy 
choice.  Participants may or may not receive pattern information would learning about the 
underlying contingencies and may or may not be able to include pattern information when 
making their responses.  Those interested in looking for and testing patterns will be unable to do 
so if pattern information is unavailable and so this manipulation should decrease rates of 
probability matching if the pattern search hypothesis is correct.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 120 undergraduate students (53 female) recruited from a campus 
student centre. They were told that they would receive up to $10 for their participation depending 
on their performance.
Procedure
The computer-based choice task was described as a game in which participants were to 
guess the colors of marbles that were to be drawn from a bag containing a mix of red and green 
marbles. The task consisted of a learning phase followed by a test phase.  In the serial learning 
condition, participants saw 40 marbles drawn, one at a time, from the bag; in total they saw 30 
green and 10 red marbles1drawn in a randomized order. This condition allowed participants to 
search for patterns should they be inclined to do so, although in fact the outcomes were serially 
independent. In the aggregate learning condition, participants were told that a total of 30 green 
marbles and 10 red marbles had been drawn from the bag, but they were not presented with trial 
                                                          
1
For ease of exposition, green will be referred to as the dominant color in the task; in fact, the dominant color was counterbalanced across participants.
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by trial outcomes and so had no opportunity to observe potential patterns.  In both learning 
conditions, participants were told that each of the 40 marbles had been drawn randomly, with 
replacement, from the bag.
In the test phase, participants were told that 20 more marbles would be drawn, with 
replacement, from the same bag, and that they would earn $0.50 each time they correctly guessed 
the color of a marble drawn from the bag.  In the serial test condition, participants were asked to 
guess the color of each marble drawn, one at a time, but without feedback regarding the color 
that was actually drawn on each trial. The serial test condition allowed participants to order their 
guesses to follow a pattern, should they choose to do so. In the aggregate test condition, 
participants were asked to indicate how many times, across the 20 draws, they would guess red, 
and how many times they would guess green. In this condition, even if participants suspected 
that that the outcomes might follow some sort of pattern, they had no way to exploit that pattern 
in making their responses.
There were 30 participants assigned to each of the four cells resulting from this 2 
(learning: serial versus aggregate) by 2 (test: serial versus aggregate) design.  After finishing the 
choice task, participants completed a questionnaire in which, among other items, they estimated 
the overall proportion of red and green marbles in the bag and then evaluated alternative choice 
strategies. Specifically, a number of strategies were described, including matching and 
maximizing, which might have been used during a game similar to the one that the participant 
had played.  In the case of this question, it was known that the bag in question contained 70% 
green marbles. Each strategy was described as having been used by a different hypothetical 
player and participants were asked to rank the players in terms of their expected payoffs. After 
13
they completed the questionnaire, participants were paid on the basis of their guesses and 
associated outcomes on the task.
RESULTS
Data from 8 participants who made more red than green guesses, or who mistakenly 
indicated red to be the more probable color in the follow-up questionnaire, were excluded from 
further analysis, as were data from 10 additional participants who failed to complete the entire 
study.
Overall, participants were largely accurate in their estimates of the probability of drawing 
a green marble (mean = 70%; SD = 8%).  
An index of a participant’s tendency to probability match versus maximize was derived 
by comparing the proportion of times that the participant chose to guess green (C) to his or her 
estimate of the proportion of green marbles in the bag (E, taken from the follow-up 
questionnaire) as follows:
choice index = (C – E)/(1 – E)
This index adjusts for differing perceptions of the probability of drawing a green marble 
from the bag. Probability matching gives rise to a score of 0 (because C = E) whereasmaximizing 
results in a score of 1 (because C = 1). Negative scores indicate choice probabilities that are 
lower than estimated probabilities (e.g., participants who made an equal number of green and red 
guesses despite estimating green to be more probable).
Across all conditions, many more participants engaged in probability matching (n = 46 
participants with an index value of 0) than in maximizing (n = 14).Choices of the remaining 
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participants did not fall in either category by these strict definitions, but the mean value of the 
index (0.12) and its distribution (see Fig. 1) underscore the appeal of strategies falling close to 
that expected by probability matching. An analysis of variance on the choice index measure 
indicated no significant main effect nor interaction between the two experimental manipulations, 
learning F(1,98) = 0.003,MSE=0.111, p = 0.96; test F(1,98) = 0.45, MSE=0.004, p = 
0.51;learning by test F(1,98) = 1.80, MSE=0.131, p = 0.18. There was no evidence that matching 
was more prevalent when potential pattern information could be identified or exploited.  
Fig 1.Distribution of choice index value across participants in study 1.  An index value of 0 indicates 
probability matching; a value of 1 indicates maximizing.
Responses to the strategy question were categorized in terms of whether the maximizing 
strategy was ranked higher or lower than the matching strategy with respect to expected payoffs. 
When explicitly presented with both strategies and encouraged to compare them, many 
participants (n = 50) ranked maximizing as the better strategy; a slightly larger number (n = 52) 



















superior on the questionnaire was significantly higher than the small proportion who actually 
used the maximizing strategy in the choice task,χ2 (1, n =102) = 12.48, p<.001.  Over 40% of 
participants (n = 37) who used a non-maximizing strategy during the choice task switched to 
endorse a maximizing strategy on the questionnaire, including 18 of 46 (39%) classified as strict 
probability matchers on the choice task. Of those participants who maximized on the choice task, 
only one (7%) switched to the matching strategy.
DISCUSSION
The patternsearch hypothesis was not supported: Participants showed no tendency to 
switch from probability matching to maximizing under conditions in which patterns could not be 
identified or exploited. Instead, probability matching was consistently more common than 
maximizing. While it is still possible that probability matching results from more of an implicit 
search for patterns, work such as that of Wolford et al. (2004), in which participants viewed a 
sequence which appeared more random and showed less probability matching as a result, 
suggests that probability matching is sensitive to the characteristics of the pattern and 
consequently that it should be possible to alter.
These findings suggest that the difference between choice-based and strategy-based 
studies is more likely explained by the increased availability of both strategies, as predicted by 
dualsystems theory, as opposed to the existence or absence of pattern information.  Notably, a 
substantial proportion of the participants in this study who engaged in probability matching on 
the choice task later acknowledged the superiority of maximizing when both strategies were 
explicitly described for comparison. This suggests that both strategies were not available to 
participants when they were choosing how to respond to the problem.  One possible reason why 
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people engage in probability matching, then, is that it springs readily to mind as a strategy 
whereas maximizing does not.  This is congruent with the ideas expressed by dualsystems
theory.  Recall that, according to this theory, probability matching would be the intuitive 
strategy, and it must be overridden to arrive at the maximizing strategy.  
It is also possible that those participants that rated maximizing as superior to matching, 
but still matched on the choice task, may have known all along that maximizing was superior, 
but chose to match for some other reason.  Boredom (Goodnow, 1955), risk aversion (Goodnow, 
1955), and a possible increase in utility of correctly predicting the infrequent response 
(Brackbill& Bravos, 1962) are all possible reasons.  It is unlikely that the utility of predicting the 
least frequent response is responsible, as in half of the conditions subjects were not able to 
directly predict the infrequent response, and these conditions did not differ significantly from 
those where they could make such a prediction.  Boredom is also unlikely as the task was short 
in all cases and especially so for those that learned and tested in the aggregate condition. In any 
case, the best way to resolve this issue is to provide participants with the strategies before the 
choice problem and determine whether these participants maximize more readily than those who 
evaluate the strategy after the choice problem.   
While Study 1 suggests that pattern information is not the reason for the method 
discrepancy, it remains an open question whether strategy availability is the reason.  Study 2 
willexamine this further by determining whether participants use the maximizing strategy more 
in a choice-based problem when the strategy is made available to them.  Study 2 tests the 
hypothesis that making both the maximizing and the matching strategy more available should 





Participants were students recruited from a campus student life centreor through 
psychology classes.  Two variants of the study were conducted with similar methods and results, 
so they are reported together here.  In the first variant, conducted in the lab, psychology 
undergraduate students (n = 60; 40 females) participated in exchange for course credit and 
played a low-stakes version of the game in which each correct guess paid $0.25.  In the second 
variant, conducted in the campus student life center, university students (n = 98; 40 females) 
played a high-stakes version of the game in which they could win up to $10 as compensation for 
their participation; in this version of the game, each correct guess paid $1.00.
Apparatus
The task involved ten pairs of cups, with one red and one green cup in each pair.  A
$1Canadian coin2 was hidden under either the red or green cup in each pair.  For each 
participant, the hiding place of the coins was determined for each pair of cups by the roll of a 
ten-sided die with 7 green faces and 3 red faces (or vice versa; dominant color was 
counterbalanced across participants).  Participants placed a black ring around either the red or 
green cup in each pair to indicate that they thought the coinwas hidden under that cup.  The pairs 
of cups were placed on a table in a tent that hid the game and outcomes from passersby.
                                                          
2 For those that received course credit, a quarter was hidden under the cup rather than a $1 coin.  For all further 
references to $1 coins, assume that the same procedure was also used with quarters for those in the variant with 
course credit as partial compensation.
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Procedure
The experimenter explained the game to participants as they sat in front of the table with 
the pairs of cups.  They were told that the coins had been hidden using the die, before they had 
entered the tent. Participants were told that they would receive $1for each correct guess.  
Afterward, half of the participants made all ten choices by placing the ten rings while half of the 
participants answered the following question:
“In the game that you are going to play, loonies are randomly placed under red and green 
cups and you will be paid if you correctly guess the color of the cup the loonie is under.  
Before you start the game please consider the following two strategies:
1) You could choose green for all 10 sets of cups
OR
2) You could choose green for seven sets of cups and red for three sets of cups.
Which strategy, 1 or 2, do you think will win you the most money?”
This question served to make both strategies available to participants prior to playing the 
game and, as such, acted as a hint.  Participants in the hint condition then made all ten choices in 
an identical way to those who had not received the hint.  Upon completion of the choice task, but 
before the cups were lifted, all participants completed a brief questionnaire.  This questionnaire 
included the hint question described above and also asked participants to indicate which strategy 
(a) their own strategy more closely resembled; (b) would be expected to earn more money; and 
(c) they would use if they were to play the game again.  The cups were then turned over and 
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participants learned how much money they had earned.  Finally, participants completed the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), a measure of chronic proneness to reliance on 
intuition or deliberation, and several other items including a self-rating of proficiency in 
mathematics and a question about the number of mathematics courses the participant had taken 
since high school.
RESULTS
The two variants of the study produced nearly identical results.  Rates of maximizing in 
each condition were very similar across the two versions of the study. In a 2 (study variant: low-
vs. high-stakes) by 2 (condition: hint vs. control) ANOVA with number of dominant color 
guesses as the dependent variable, study variant had no significant main effect nor was its 
interaction with condition statistically significant.  Hence, we collapse over the study variable in 
subsequent analyses.
In the same ANOVA, condition (hint versus control) had a significant main effect on 
number of dominant color guesses, F(1,154) = 7.17, MSE =20.861, p = .008.  In the control 
condition, participants chose the dominant color an average of 7.9 times out of 10; by contrast, in 
the hint condition, participants chose the dominant color 8.7 times out of 10.  Figure 2a shows 
the full frequency distribution of this variable by condition.  The proportion of participants 
engaging in strict maximizing in the no-hint condition was 35% (27 out of 78 participants).  
Among participants in the hint condition, the rate of strict maximization was significantly higher 
at 53% (42 out of 80 participants), χ2 (1, n =158) = 5.14, p = .023.  The hint manipulation also 
had a marginally significant impact on self-reported strategy use as elicited following the choice 
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task,  χ2 (1,n =158) = 3.05, p=.081, with 47 of 80 participants (58%) in the hint condition stating 
that their strategy more closely resembled maximizing than matching, versus only 35 of 78 
participants (45%) in the no-hint condition.  
Fig. 2a.Distribution of number of dominant color choices in Study 2, where the expected number of such choices is 7 
given a matching strategy and 10 given a maximizing strategy, for the hint (solidline) and no-hint (dashed line) 
conditions.
The hint manipulation did not have a significant effect on the other strategy questions 
asking which has the higher expected payoff and which the participants would use if they were to 
play the game again. On both measures, the maximizing strategy was selected by the majority of 
participants:  61 out of 80 participants in the hint condition and 62 out of 78 in the no-hint 
condition selected maximizing as having the higher expected payoff, and 51 of 79 participants in 
the hint condition (one person did not complete this item) and 53 of 78 participants in the no-hint 
condition said they would maximize if they were to play the game again.  Thus both groups 
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endorsed the maximizing strategy to the same extent when it was brought to their attention as an 
alternative to matching but, when this question was posed before the choice task, participants 
were more likely to use it in making their choices.  Figure 2b shows, for each condition, the 
proportion of participants classified as matchers or maximizers on the choice task3 as well as 
endorsement rates of the strategies on the three strategy comparison questions.
To clarify the impact of the hint manipulation on choice task performance, we can restrict 
our analysis to the subset of participants who endorsed maximization as the better strategy when 
presented with the strategy comparison question after completing the choice task.4  This analysis 
provides an estimate of the influence of strategy availability, then, among the subset of 
participants who are able to identify the better strategy in a direct comparison.  As noted above, 
the number of participants who chose maximizing as superior in the post-task strategy 
comparison was virtually identical in the hint and no-hint conditions (n = 61 and 62, 
respectively), indicating that participants in both groups were equally able to recognize the better 
strategy in the direct comparison.  But when this strategy was not readily available at the time 
that the choice task was performed, in the no-hint condition, the rate of strict maximization was 
much lower (27 out of 62 participants, or 44%, maximized) than when it was readily available, in 
the hint condition (42 out of 61 participants, or 69%, maximized), χ2 (1, n =123) = 7.99, p = .005.
Next we turn to scores on the CRT, which consists of three mathematical problems, each 
of which gives rise to an initial intuitive answer that can clearly be identified as incorrect when 
subjected to further scrutiny (Frederick, 2005).  Thus, the number of correct answers on the CRT 
                                                          
3 Participants were classified as maximizers if they guessed green 9 or more times and matchers if they guessed 
green 6, 7 or 8 times.  This coincides closely with their self-ratings of their own strategy use.
4Results of this analysis do not change when we consider hint-condition participants’ pre-choice-task responses to 
this question instead of their post-task responses.
22
can be taken as an index of the individual’s ability to override their initial intuition in favor of a 
more deliberative approach to the problem that yields the correct solution.  CRT scores 
correlated positively with number of dominant color guesses, r = .36, p< .001.  CRT remained 
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statistically significant when entered simultaneously as a predictor with number of math courses 
taken, providing some indication that it accounts for something other than simple ability at math. 
Finally, the correlations between CRT and the number of dominant color guesses on the 
choice task were computed separately for the hint and the no-hint conditions.  Althoughthe 
correlations remained significant when computed within each condition, they tended to be 
stronger in the hint than in the no-hint condition:  In the hint condition, the correlation with 
number of dominant color choices was .43 for CRT; in the no-hint condition, the corresponding 
correlation was .28 for CRT.Compared to participants prone toward reliance on intuition, those 
prone toward reliance on deliberation apparently benefited more from the hint.  Figure 6 displays 
this pattern of results for the CRT scores.  Notably, those scoring zero on the CRT (i.e., those 
presumed to be most reliant on intuition) apparently did not benefit from the hint at all.
DISCUSSION
The results of Study 2 support the dualsystems hypothesis and suggest that one reason people 
fail to maximize is that they fail to consider the maximizing strategy as an alternative.  In other 
words, probability matching is so intuitive that it is often the only solution to the problem that 
participants consider.  When the maximizing strategy was provided in a hint prior to the choice 
task, participants not only endorsed the strategy but they also went on to use the strategy more 
than those who did not receive the hint prior to the task.  This suggests that, for many 
participants, the problem is not in their ability to realize that maximizing is superior, but in their 
likelihood of considering maximizing in the first place.
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This finding answers our initial question regarding why choice-based studies and strategy-
based studies differ, by suggesting that it is because the latter provides both strategies for 
participants to evaluate.  In other words, providing a hint avoids the discrepancy in strategy 
availability typical of choice-based studies.
The discrepancy in strategy availability suggests that matching is intuitive whereas 
maximizing requires deliberation.  Specifically, the deliberative system must override the 
impulse to employ the first strategy that comes to mind and engage in a more exhaustive search 
for alternative strategies.  The importance of deliberation is further supported by the correlation 
between CRT scores and maximizing observed in Study 2.  A correlation that was maintained 
even when controlling for ability at mathematics.These findings suggested that those who were 
more deliberative in nature were more likely to maximize.
It is not clear how any of these findings would be easily explained by the patternsearch
hypothesis.  This account does not answer (a) why participants would be less likely to search for 
patterns (and thus maximize) after being provided with both the maximizing and matching 
strategies in a hint or (b) why those with a tendency to deliberate (as indicated by CRT score)
would not bother searching for patterns.  Thus, the results of Study 2 provide more support for a 
dualsystems account than for a pattern search account of probability matching.  
Dualsystems theory has provided a compelling account of the data presented thus far, but one 
could argue that it misses the real crux of the issue by failing to address why probability 
matching is intuitive in the first place.  It also fails to explain why groups (non-human species 
and young children) that we generally consider to be less deliberative than adult humans choose 
maximizing strategies.  
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To address these issues we have suggested a new theory that we call expectation 
matching.Expectation matching is based on research showing that people tend to expect very 
small samples to be representative of the contingencies of their parent populations
(Tversky&Kahenman 1971; Kahenman&Tversky 1972).  For example, if you were to flip a coin 
twice you would expect it to come up heads once and tails once, although the chances that it will 
come up as one or the other twice in a row are quite high.  The representativeness bias is the
tendency to overestimate the likelihood that the outcome will consist of one heads and one tails.  
In the die problem mentioned above, this means that participants would expect 7 green and 3 red 
rolls exactly, even when you only roll the die 10 times.  Expectation matching argues that the 
probability matching strategy is selected based on this highly salient expected outcome. 
Work by Gal and Barron (1996) provides support for the hypothesis that this expectation 
is highly salient to participants employing a probability matching strategy.  They asked 
participants to explain why they selected certain strategies over others after participants 
completed a word problem version of a binary choice task.  Participants that chose to probability 
match tended to citeas the reasons for their strategy choice(1) expectations of the long term 
distribution, and (2) the belief that the distribution will turn up as predicted.  
Gal and Barron(1996) also noted that these participants tended to have a poorer 
understanding of independence, mostly due to their tendency to endorse the gambler’s fallacy5.  
Gambler’s fallacy can also be attributed to the representativeness bias.   Those that endorse the 
gambler’s fallacy tend to view runs as increasing the likelihood that the non-run event will occur 
“on the grounds that the sequence will balance out locally” (participant’s words in Gal& Barron, 
                                                          
5This is in spite of the fact that participants were usually able to define independence, although they often didnot 
trust their own mathematical intuitions and went with their “gut.”
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1996, p. 88).  These endorsements of the Gambler’s fallacy led many participants to select a 
strategy in which they mostly guessed the more probable outcome, but switched to the less 
probable outcome after an unusually long streak of the more probable occurrence.  This resulted 
in a number of participants classified as over-matchers.6  The focus of both over-matchers and 
probability matchers on the local representativeness of the sequence suggests that these 
participants are heavily focused on global expected outcome (overall, how many reds and greens 
do I expect) rather than on the contingencies of each individual die roll.  
With the expectation of 7 green and 3 red beinghighly salient, subjects then match to this 
expectation.  But why?  One possibility is that they fail to properly identify the actual problem 
that they are attempting to solve.  To predict outcomes perfectly in a dual choice task, 
participants do not need to know the overall distribution of green and red (the expectation), but 
instead the sequence of these reds and greens.  It is this second part of the problem that 
participants overlook.Thus, they substitute for the answer to a relatively easy question (Which 
overall distribution is most likely?) the answer to the more difficult question (Which exact 
sequence of reds and greens is most likely?), a process known as attribute substitution 
(Kahneman& Frederick, 2002).    Of course, the answer to the easy question is 7 green and 3 red, 
but to actually accurately predict outcomes in a binary choice task, one needs to know the answer 
to the harder question. In this case, the most likely single sequence is all green7, because green is 
the most likely occurrence on any individual roll.  Adding a red to the sequence adds a lower 
probability event, decreasing the overall probability of that particular sequence.   But if you 
                                                          
6  Note that this might explain the earlier findings of Wolford et al.(2004), in which making a sequence with more 
alterations (and therefore fewer streaks) led to significantly more maximizing, due to over-matchers becoming 
maximizers.  
7 All green should occur close to 3% of the time, while any give sequence of 7 green and 3 red should only occur 
roughly 0.2% of the time.
28
ignore sequence information and simply ask the easy question, it is easy to think that you need 
only match what you expect to see overall to achieve the highest payoff.  
The expectation matching hypothesis also provides a solution to the logical inconsistency of 
why a more deliberative behavior (maximizing) is endorsed by young children and non-human 
mammals, while the intuitive behavior (matching) is not.  This puzzle is not easily solved by the 
dual systems account alone, nor is it addressed by the patternsearch hypothesis.  Expectation 
matching, however, would claim that young children and non-human mammals are not able to 
generate an expectation across multiple trials, thus they should not be subject to the 
representativeness bias.  According to this hypothesis, a young child, for example, would 
maximize in the die game, but would not be able to report that they expect to see 7 green and 3 
red. Congruent with this prediction, DerksandPaclisanu (1967) found that while 4-year-olds did 
maximize, they were not able to verbally report which outcome was more likely.  The most 
likely explanation for maximizing behavior in young children and non-human mammals, 
therefore, would be that they choose the more likely outcome all the time because it is the most 
frequently rewarded behavior.  If they are able to generate some kind of expectation, without the 
ability to plan (and recall) across multiple trials, they would likely ask themselves “Which is 
more likely on just this trial?”  The answer would always be green and, therefore, their choices 
would always be green.
Studies 3, 4 and 5are inspired by this localized view.  We endeavored to test the expectation 
matching hypothesis by putting undergraduate students in the mind frame of a rat.  In other 
words, we wanted to reduce their tendency to generate an expectation for the entire sequence of 
10 outcomes, by focusing them on individual trials instead of the whole sequence.  Expectation 
matching would predict that this should increase maximizing behavior.
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We also examined whether the hard question “which sequence is most likely?” posed above 
is actually hard.  We probed whether participants are able to identify that all green is the single 
most likely sequence by asking participants “Which strategy (matching or maximizing) is most 





Participants were 132 undergraduates from the University of Waterloo who completed 
the study online for course credit.
Procedure
They were asked to play a series of 10 guessing games in which they were to predict for 
each game which of two possible outcomes would occur.  They were told in advance that, in 
each of the 10 games, one outcome would occur with 70% probability and the other with 30% 
probability.  Participants were asked to imagine that they would be paid $1 for each correct 
prediction, and asked to indicate their prediction in each of the 10 games.  They were not 
informed of the game outcomes.  
In the unique games condition, participants were told they would be playing 10 different
games, the specifics of which would be described to them as they played each game.  They then 
made predictions for 10 mathematically equivalent games with superficial individuating 
characteristics.  For example, one game involved drawing ping-pong balls from a bingo cage; 
another involved spinning a wheel of fortune; and another involved rolling a 10-sided die.  Order 
of game presentation was randomized across participants.  In the repeated games condition, one 
of the 10 games from the unique games condition was randomly selected for each participant and 
presented to him or her 10 times.
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Finally, participants answered a strategy question in which they compared the 
maximizing and matching strategies.  As in Studies 1 and 2, they were asked which of the two 
strategies was most likely to earn the most money.  Now, however, we also asked them which of 
the two strategies was most likely to result in getting all 10 guesses correct.  
RESULTS
Data from two participants who predicted the unlikely outcome more often than the likely 
outcome were excluded from further analysis, as were data from three additional participants 
who did not complete the entire choice task.
Figure 3 shows the full distribution of the number of times that each participant predicted 
the more likely outcome.  Participants in the unique games condition (n = 66) were more likely 
than those in the repeated games condition (n = 61) to engage in strict maximization, that is, to 
predict the more likely outcome in all ten choices, χ2 (1, n = 127) = 8.39p = .004.  Strict 
probability matching (predicting the more likely outcome on 7 of 10 choices), by contrast, was 
common in the repeated games condition but not in the unique games condition, χ2 (1, n = 127) = 
24.11p< .001.
When asked which strategy was more likely to earn the most money, 86.6% of 
participants in the repeated condition answered maximizing. By contrast, only 45.9% of those 
same participants thought maximizing was the best way to get all ten guesses correct.  The 
numbers were higher in the unique condition, with 92.4% responding that maximizing was the 
best way to make money and 71.2% responding that it was the best way to get all ten guesses 
correct.  A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that there was a significant main effect of 
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question, F(1,125)=33.33, MSE=0.17, p<.001, and a significant main effect of condition 
F(1,125)=11.30, MSE=0.196, p<.001, but no interaction. 
Fig. 3.Distribution of the number of predictions in study 3 of the morelikely outcome (rather than the lesslikely 






























In Study 3, the various games presented in the unique games condition all shared 
common outcome probabilities of 70% and 30%, and this was noted in the instructions, but how 
these probabilities were presented varied across the games.  In some, they were given directly as 
probabilities or relative frequencies of occurrence; in others, they could be inferred from 
characteristics of the chance device (e.g., a draw from a bag of 100 tickets, where 70 are orange 
and the other 30 are black).  Study 4 tested whether individuating the outcomes in the sequence 
would decrease probability matching and increase maximizing even when the games wereall 
based on a common chance device.
METHOD
Participants
University of Waterloo undergraduates (n= 129) completed the online study in exchange 
for psychology course credit.
Procedure
The participants were asked to consider a game involving 10 rolls of a 10-sided die.  
Seven sides of the die, they were told, were marked one way, and the remaining three sides were 
marked another way.  In the repeated games condition, all 10 rolls involved a die with 7 red sides 
and 3 green sides.  In the unique games condition, each roll was said to involve a different die 
with unique markings.  For instance, in addition to the die marked with red and green sides as 
above, another die had 7 sides marked with triangles and 3 sides marked with squares.  Other 
markings included letters and icons such as flowers and hearts.
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Participants responded to the same two strategy questions as mentioned in Study 3.
RESULTS
Data from one participant who predicted the unlikely outcome more often than the likely 
outcome were excluded from further analysis, as were data from a second participant who did 
not complete the entire choice task.
Within the repeated games condition, for some participants the sequence was described 
as a single game consisting of 10 rolls of the die, and for others it was described as 10 games of 1 
roll each.  Analyses demonstrated that this factor had no influence on the results and so it is not 
discussed further.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the number of times each participant guessed the more 
likely outcome.  Participants in the unique games condition (n = 38) were more likely than those 
in the repeated games condition (n = 89) to engage in strict maximization, that is, to predict the 
more likely outcome in all ten choices, χ2 (1, n= 127) = 4.59, p = .03.  Strict probability 
matching, by contrast, was more prevalent in the repeated games condition than in the unique 
games condition, χ2 (1, n = 127) = 5.41, p = .02.
35
Fig. 4.Distribution of the number of predictions of the morelikely outcome (rather than the lesslikely outcome) 
across participants in the two conditions.
Once again, the strategy questions revealed that participants were more able to identify 
maximizing as a better strategy when asked about making money than when asked about getting 
all 10 guesses correct.  In the repeated condition, 85.4% of participants responded that 
maximizing was the best strategy for making money whereas only 60.7% also chose it as the best 
strategy for getting all 10 guesses correct.  In the unique condition, the numbers rose to 94.7% 
and 65.8%, respectively.  A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of question 































In Studies 3 and 4, introducing individuating features to the outcome sequence reduced 
probability matching and increased maximizing.  We suggest that this is because the 
individuating features made it less likely that participants would generate and expectation for all 
10 guesses at once.  In Study 5, we sought convergent evidence for this interpretation by keeping 
the features of the sequence itself fixed but preceding it with a priming manipulation designed to 
draw focus either to the sequence as a whole or to the individual outcomes within the sequence. 
METHOD
Participants
University of Waterloo students (N = 84) were recruited at a public location on campus 
and asked to complete a brief questionnaire.
Procedure
Participants were asked to consider the game from Study 4 in which a 10-sided die, with 
7 green sides and 3 red sides, would be rolled 10 times and each correct prediction would yield a 
$1 payoff.  Participants indicated their predictions for each of the 10 rolls by circling either green 
or redon a grid.
Before playing the game, those in the global focus condition were asked, “In 10 rolls of 
the die, how many times would you expect each outcome?”  This question was intended to 
encourage generation of an aggregate expectation for the sequence as a whole.  Participants in 
the local focus condition were asked, “On any individual roll of the die, which color is more 
likely to be rolled?”  This question was intended to focus participants on the contingencies of an 
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individual trial rather than expected outcomes for the sequence as a whole, and thereby to reduce 
the tendency to probability match.  Over 80% of participants in the global focus condition and all 
participants in the local focus condition answered the priming question correctly.
RESULTS
Incomplete data from one participant were removed from further analysis.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the number of times each participant guessed the more 
likely outcome.  Participants in the local focus condition (n = 42) were more likely than those in 
the global focus condition (n = 41) to engage in strict maximization, that is, to predict the more 
likely outcome in all ten choices, χ2 (1, n= 83) = 7.33, p = .007.  Strict probability matching, by 
contrast, was more prevalent in the global focus condition than in the local focus condition, χ2 (1, 
n= 83) = 4.35, p = .04.
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Fig. 5.Distribution of the number of predictions in study 5 of the morelikely outcome (rather than the lesslikely 





























Discussion of Studies 3, 4 and 5
Results from Studies 3 and 4 showed that making trials of a binary choice task appear to 
be independent by (a) taking each trial from a superficially different game or (b) rolling a 
superficially different die for each roll leads to more maximizing behavior.  Furthermore, Study 
5 suggests that even focusing participants on individual trials as opposed to global outcomes can 
increase the rate of maximization.  In addition, Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that participants 
have much more difficulty realizing that maximizing is the best strategy for predicting all 10 
guesses correctly than they do acknowledging it as the most likely strategy to win the most 
money.  This is especially amusing because, in this particular case, these two questions are based 
on the same underlying concept.  The strategy that is most likely to make you the most money is 
also, by definition, the most likely to get all guesses correct.  
These results are congruent with those predicted by the expectation matching hypothesis, 
but should be viewed as preliminary evidence.  It is important to note that the expectation
matching hypothesis makes a particular prediction about the scenarios tested in these studies, and 
that those predictions were confirmed, but the studies did not directly test whether expectations 
were affected by the manipulation. Much further research is required to confirm the exact effect 
of these manipulations
I have four specific recommendations for further research.  First, these studies do not 
establish that individuating trials actually operates by affecting expectations or reducing 
representativeness bias.  Mechanism was not addressed in these studies so further research is 
necessary to establish exactly what mechanism is operating. Preliminary work examining this 
issue could simply ask participants some probing questions about why they chose particular 
strategies, similar to what was done by Gal and Barron (1996), but in the context of individuated 
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trials.  Those in the individuated conditions should make less reference to the expected outcome 
across all 10 trials and should be less susceptible to fallacies based on a poor understanding of 
independence, such as gambler’s fallacy.
Second, even if we accept that expectation generation is affected by individuating the 
trials, this work still does not clarify whether individuating trials prevents participants from 
generating an expectation in the first place or whether it simply encourages them to ignore the 
expectation.  One possible way to resolve this issue would be to cross the unique repeated 
manipulations from Studies 3 and 4 with the priming manipulation(plus a control condition with 
no prime) from Study 5. The participants of interest in this design would be those who were in 
the unique condition and received the global prime.  If the unique manipulation prevents the 
generation of an expectation, than forcing them to generate an expectation via the global prime 
should increased matching in that condition relative to a control condition.  By contrast, if the 
expectation was always generated but simply ignored, the global prime should have no effect on 
strategy selection.
Third, in Study 5 we did not include a control condition because we were interested 
simply in comparing those with a local focus to those with a global focus.  However, if we are 
interested in establishing that a global focus is the default, it would be useful to rerun Study 5 
with a control condition that receives no priming question.  These subjects should look very 
similar to those in the global condition.
Finally, the strategy questions in Studies 3 and 4 provided a preliminary investigation of 
participants’ understanding of the proposed “hard question,” namely “Which exact sequence is 
most likely?”  We demonstrated that answers to this question are much poorer than to the 
theoretically identical question querying making money—and indeed also worse than 
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maximizing rates in the game itself. It would be useful to have further research confirming that 
understanding of the hard question is poor.  Furthermore, future research should address why 
answers to the sequence question are worse than answers to the money question even though, in 
this case, they are asking the same thing as the money question.  
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Conclusion
Overall, this thesis found that thepatternsearch hypothesis does not provide a compelling 
account of the results obtained in Studies 1-5.  Study 1 demonstrated that probability matching 
behavior is not influenced by the availability of pattern information, nor is it affected by a lack of 
ability to include pattern information in responses, contrary to what would be predicted by the 
pattern-search account.  Study 2 found that making both strategies equally available greatly 
improved participants’ ability to choose the optimal strategy.  This suggests that probability 
matching may occur because participants fail to think of maximizing as an alternative.  Again 
this is not easily accounted for by the patternsearch account, but fits well with the dualsystems
account of probability matching.  This difference in availability also explains why studies in the 
literature that make both strategies equally available find higher rates of maximizing.
The dualsystems account of probability matching argues that maximizing is a deliberative 
strategy that must override the more intuitive probability matching strategy, but does not explain 
why probability matching is intuitive.  I suggest that this intuition arises from expectation 
matching, the tendency to generate an expectation about aggregate outcomes across a sequence 
and to make choices based on this expectation.  I hypothesized that this expectation influences 
choice through attribute substitution, with participants focusing on the most probable aggregate 
outcome and ignoring the fact that they lack information about how to sequence their guesses.
Studies 3, 4, and 5 demonstrated that making trials more independent greatly reduces 
probability matching, as predicted by the expectation matching hypothesis.  In addition, Studies 
3 and 4 also established that participants are very poor at answering the relatively difficult 
question regarding outcome sequence. This supports the argument that participants tend to 
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ignore this information and substitute the easier question of expected outcomes, as suggested by 
attribute substitution.
Further research is required to test whether expectation matching is a good extension of 
the dualsystems account of probability matching.  Nevertheless, the results of the studies 
reported here strongly suggest that dual systems is a better account of probability matching 
behavior than is pattern matching, that probability matching is intuitive, and that expectation 
matching may be the mechanism behind the intuition.
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